Finding
Across the working pattern catalogue, the same Safe contract deployed at the same CREATE2 address on multiple chains is one of the highest-recurrence structural shapes. Two failure modes recur: identical-signer-set key reuse (a single threshold-passing event compromises every chain in one operation) and per-chain threshold or signer-set drift (the depositor-facing identity is the same but the actual security posture diverges between chains). The pattern is independent of protocol category — it surfaces in lending, bridges, vault families, and curator surfaces alike.
Verification
Per-chain `getOwners()` and `getThreshold()` reads, cross-chain diffing for parity. Signer-set classification independent of role-assignment claims in deployment-record files (live `hasRole` against the deployed contract is canonical; deployment-record JSON is treated as historical only).
Outcome
Multiple bilateral disclosures across the corpus; case-study patterns published anonymized once each thread closes. Direct industry feedback that the live-state cross-chain probe surfaces real, previously-undocumented findings that source-level audit did not scope.
What this shows
The methodology's per-chain live-state discipline is the load-bearing piece. Reading from deployment-record artifacts or single-chain documentation produces a false sense of uniformity. Treating each chain as an independent deployed-configuration surface surfaces drift that the depositor-facing narrative hides.